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Abstract 
Religion is based on the perspective of attitudes and attention to the doctrines that apply in everyday life. On its 
journey, diversity is often a symbol and goal of achieving certain interests. However, sometimes he often raises 
conflicts within the structure of society. Power and religion sometimes cannot be united, which results in friction 
between the authorities and their people. In this regard, the existence of this study wants to highlight the 
dynamics of intellectual diversity in public space. They want to fight for religious rights that have been ruled out 
by the government. So that with the metamorphosed Tarbiyah movement being campus preaching, they have 
directed a non-confrontational movement that fights Islam in the public space by taking mosque settings as the 
foundation of religious idealism in the modern era. The rise of campus preaching in various universities 
throughout Indonesia originated from the concerns of Islamic activists on the impartiality of the authorities in a 
system based on religious guidance. Especially in the era of the 70s when the New Order replaced the Old 
Order, many actions were contrary to Islamic norms. The further development of the preaching of this campus is 
growing rapidly, as a result there is a new Islamic model conducted by students who try to instill an ethical 
system to the community. This study uses a qualitative method that combines literature sources with a 
phenomenological approach that refers to field data. Therefore the final result of this study presents the religious 
aspirations of young intellectuals in their relations with the political interests of the ruler who display modern 
piety attitudes that process into contemporary Islamic models in the public sphere. 
Keywords: Islamization, students, new order, public sphere, symbols 
Abstrak  
Keberagamaan didasarkan pada perspektif sikap dan atensi atas doktrin yang berlaku di dalam 
kehidupan sehari-hari. Pada perjalanannya, keberagamaan seringkali menjadi simbol dan tujuan 
mencapai kepentingan tertentu. Namun, adakalanya ia kerap memunculkan pertentangan di dalam 
struktur masyarakat. Kekuasaan dan agama terkadang tidak bisa disatukan, yang berakibat pada 
gesekan antara penguasa dengan rakyatnya. Berkaitan dengan hal tersebut, adanya penelitian ini ingin 
menyoroti dinamika keberagamaan kaum intelektual di ruang publik. Mereka ingin memperjuangkan 
keberagamaan yang selama ini dikesampingkan penguasa. Sehingga dengan gerakan Tarbiyah yang 
bermetamorfosa menjadi dakwah kampus, mereka telah mengarahkan pada suatu gerakan non-
konfrontatif yang memperjuangkan Islam di ruang publik dengan mengambil seting masjid sebagai 
landasan idealisme keberagamaan di era modern. Maraknya dakwah kampus di berbagai universitas di 
seluruh Indonesia berawal dari keprihatinan para aktivis Islam terhadap keberpihakan penguasa pada 
liberalisasi nilai dan moral. Terlebih di era 70-an saat Orde Baru menggantikan Orde Lama, banyak 
sekali tindakan-tindakan yang bertentangan dengan norma Islam. Perkembangan selanjutnya, dakwah 
kampus ini berkembang dengan pesat, akibatnya terjadi model keislaman baru yang dilakukan oleh 
mahasiswa yang mencoba menanamkan sistem etika kepada masyarakat. Penelitian ini menggunakan 
metode kualitatif yang memadukan sumber-sumber pustaka dengan pendekatan fenomenologis yang 
mengacu dari data lapangan. Oleh karena itu, hasil akhir penelitian ini menyuguhkan aspirasi 
keberagamaan kaum intelektual muda dalam persinggungannya dengan kepentingan politik penguasa 
yang menampilkan sikap-sikap kesalehan modern yang berproses menjadi model Islamisasi 
kontemporer di ruang publik. 
Kata Kunci: Islamisasi, mahasiswa, orde baru, ruang publik, simbol 
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Backgound  
  
The inspiration for peace for mankind 
comes from religion, so the teachings of truth 
come from it. Therefore, it requires an attitude 
of divine transcendence that leads to mutual 
respect between human beings. In addition, 
hostage taking to the essence of divine values 
is the cause of exploitative and excessive acts 
in actualizing religious teachings.1 
The changing era now requires a shift in 
values in society, editorial attitudes in the name 
of obedience and obedience have been 
associated as a teaching system that must be 
practiced. Strengthening spiritual values is the 
belief of some modern society for the 
modernization situation that has occurred so 
far. On the other hand, scripture is the 
reference of the scripturalists in launching 
spiritual being in the constellation of 
understanding of modern-day religion.2 Truth 
claim emergence only gives a hidden message 
in showing the reality of religion that is. 
Democratization and egalitarianism have been 
used in pouring religious texts flexibly, which is 
adjusted to the times. It seems that what is 
presented by leading social thinkers reflects 
this situation, that religion will experience a 
degradation of function as globalization 
develops. Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl 
Marx, and Comte seemed to see the similarity 
of the way of looking at modern society in the 
20th century to the death of the spirit of 
religious spirituality so that religion loses its 
main essence. The sacred texts are only 
practiced as a rite as a result, the domination of 
the values of fundamentalism becomes lost. 
Ethno-religious inequality is a domain that is 
difficult to solve until now.3 
                                                          
1 , Nelly van Doorn-Harder. "Muslim Legal 
Thought in Modern Indonesia." Journal of the American 
Oriental Society, vol. 130, no. 1, 2010, p. 132-135.  
2  Parry Benita, “What is left in Postcolonial 
Studies”, New Literary History, 43(2), 2012,p. 341-392. 
3 Joshua Edelman, Performing Religion in Public 
(UK & US: Palgrave Macmillan,2013). 
In this paper, I want to present religious 
patterns that began in the New Order era. On 
the other hand, the various patterns of 
congruence have influenced the indoctrinate of 
some circles. In addition, the influence of 
power also resulted in the depoliticization of 
religion in the public sphere. Referring to this, 
the power established by the New Order 
narrated the interests of the authorities on one 
side. 
In a different aspect, this regime has 
succeeded in making the religious system out 
of place. Transnationalism movements began 
to emerge in this era, but their existence was 
not so visible, because the New Order saw 
enough in creating a single political 
domestication. 4  By some circles, the attitude 
taken to criticize the New Order is to build 
non-confrontational power among educated 
people. They try to build the power of da'wah 
through campus. Therefore, there was 
modernized Islamization, which the authorities 
did not seem to smell.5 
Also, in this paper, I will elaborate the 
interests of educated people, namely students 
in carrying out their actions to confront the 
authorities. Regime depoliticism attitudes 
toward Muslims seem to be the cause of the 
students raising the power of da'wah secretly. 
They try to display Islam in an understanding 
that is believed to be true. Halaqoh on campus 
is a kind of routine that will strengthen their 
religious attitude. 6  There has not been any 
aspect of radicalism in this model but lately, 
after the New Order stepped down, the 
                                                          
4 Robert W. Hefner "Politics in Indonesia: 
Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance." The 
Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 58, no. 1, 1999, p.271-272. 
5  Peter Lape, "Focus on Islam  IV: 
Archaeological Approaches to the Study of Islam in 
Island Southeast Asia." Antiquity, vol. 79, no. 306, 2005, 
p.829-836. 
6  Agus A. Safei,  "In A Nation Of Muslims 
Political Islam Is struggling To Win Vote: Role Of 
Islam and The Political Crisis in Indonesia."International 
Journal of Arts & Sciences, vol. 8, no. 7, 2015, p. 319-326. 
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students' religious attitudes have changed to a 
more dogmatic current. 
The need to establish good 
communication to create comfort, and 
consistency in realizing a balance and even 
avoiding suspicion caused by sustainable 
religious conflict.7 So religion is no longer seen 
as a scary thing. Labeling religion that is not 
true must also be resolved comprehensively, 
religious exclusiveness, patterns that are not in 
accordance with modern civilization should 
actually be eliminated.8 The stigma that is often 
not pinned on that religion is the cause of fear 
and horror as Albert Hourani conveyed does 
not become a reality, if in the past Islam was 
conveyed with a sword, only as a defense 
against the enemies of Islam who used 
violence.9 
The contextualization of the verse 
becomes inevitable when brought from the 
past dimension to the modern era, Islam is 
directed to the understanding of the absolute 
Shari'a, so as to be used as a justification for 
tasyri 'which prevailed at that time. 10  The 
Geraudy view opens a perspective path 
towards the rise of the logic of Islamic 
fundamentalism which considers corpus 
(sacred text) as essential truth without the 
existence of multiple interpretations.11 On the 
other hand, the expression Geraudy creates 
ambiguity in the Muslim community. Respect 
for the Sunnah as a legacy of the Prophet is a 
natural thing, this cannot be used as a 
                                                          
7 Mun'im Sirry,  "The Public Expression of 
Traditional Islam: The Pesantren and Civil Society in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia." The Muslim World, vol. 100, 
no. 1, 2010, p. 60-77. 
8  Chiara Formichi,  "Islam in Indonesia: The 
Contest for Society, Ideas, and Value." Indonesia, no. 
103, 2017, p. 95-98.  
9 Derek Hopwood. "Albert Hourani: Islam, 
Christianity and Orientalism." British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 2003, p. 127-136. 
10 Robert W. Hefner, "Islamizing Java? Religion 
and Politics in Rural East Java." The Journal of Asian 
Studies (1986-1998), vol. 46, no. 3, 1987, p.533. 
11 Itzchak Weismann. "Modernity from within: 
Islamic Fundamentalism and Sufism."Der Islam, vol. 86, 
no. 1, 2011, p. 142-170. 
characteristic of Islamic fundamentalism. 
Criticism that is in line needs to be shown in 
looking at fundamentalism as a model to 
uncover the contextualization of the prevailing 
religion. 
Bustaman-Ahmad, citing the exposure of 
several Islamic thinkers such as Said al-
Ashmawy, Azyumardi Azra, John Obert Vall. 
Said al-Ashmawy saw that political attitudes 
can be derivative into political fundamentalism, 
then in another form as ratioanalist- 
fundamentalism. The difference between them 
lies in the position of revelation which is 
considered still sacred so that for rationalists 
following the teachings of revelation in 
modern times is a necessity. While political 
fundamentalism narrows the components of 
revelation in smaller discourses and interpret 
them according to the interests of their groups. 
Impartiality towards humanist Islam and 
universalism is characteristic of fundamentalist 
activist groups, so John Obert Vall emphasizes 
by adding traditional fundamentalists. For him, 
Saudi Arabia is a feature of this movement. 
Militancy loyalty is seen from the movement, 
that fundamentalism has been formed based 
on the royal political oligarchy which has been 
maintained until now. Whereas radical 
fundamentalism offers a more complex 
composition of the masses, promoting a more 
participatory attitude combined with 
opportunistic figures in it.12 
Azyumardi Azra said a different 
argument, he divided into two aspects. To 
facilitate this perspective, he pointed out the 
emergence of fundamentalism in the Arabian 
Peninsula led by Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhab, while the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement led by Hasan al-Bana became the 
first pre-modern fundamentalism movement 
period. This second typology is influenced by 
                                                          
12 Kamaruzzaman Bustaman-Ahmad, Relasi Islam 
dan Negara: Perspektif Modernis dan Fundamentalis ( Jakarta: 
Indonesiatera,2001),p.25-29. 
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aspects of culture, politics, economics and so 
on originating from the West.13 
Islamic dynamics in the middle east of 
the 18th century had an impact on the Islamic 
situation in Indonesia, in that region, Islam 
became a magnet and central to other regions, 
such as Africa and Asia. Geopolitically the 
existence of Saudi Arabia and other Middle 
Eastern regions such as Egypt, Iran and so on 
has had a strong influence in the international 
world.14 In the beginning, this area also became 
a center for Islamic studies, especially in Saudi 
Arabia which became the center of the modern 
Islamic puritanism movement, which 
characterized itself as an Islamic state free from 
syncretism.15 
Islamic revivalism in the Middle East 
also contributed inspiration to Islamic activists 
in Indonesia, such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement pioneered by Hasan al-Bana. At the 
same time, Indonesia's political situation in the 
early 20th century intersected with the interests 
of certain groups in fighting for Islam, with the 
birth of various Islamic organizations such as 
Muhammadiyah, Persis, Al-Irsyad, and NU. 
The development of pesantren and madrasa is 
increasing, so post-independence Islamic 
intensity in Indonesia is so high. The role of 
diplomacy is an institutional element between 
Indonesia and the Middle East, especially 
Egypt. The relationship between the two 
countries after Soekarno's resignation was so 
close, the government also vigorously sent its 
students to study in the country. Starting in the 
70s, Islam began to be facilitated by the 
Indonesian government and some Islamic 
                                                          
13 Azyumardi Azra, Pergolakan Politik Islam : Dari 
Fundamentalisme, Modernisme hingga Post-Modernisme 
(Jakarta: Paramadina,1996),p.67-73. 
14 Quintain Wiktorowicz,  "The Future of Islam 
in the Middle East: Fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria, 
and Saudi Arabia / Islamism, Secularism, and Human 
Rights in the Middle East." International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, vol. 33, no. 1, 2001, p. 154-156. 
15 Igor Lipovsky,. "The Awakening of Central 
Asian Islam." Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 32, no. 3, 1996, 
pp. 4-7. 
figures at that time. At the same time, the 
Middle East's political, social and economic 
climate influences the situation in Indonesia, in 
turn, the construction of Middle Eastern Islam 
is developing in Indonesia, with its 
transnational movements.16 
 
New Order depoliticization Against 
Muslims 
A fairly accommodative Islamic situation 
in the New Order era appeared to be a mirage, 
behind that the regime put pressure in such a 
way. At first, he provided space for the Muslim 
community to display its characteristics, but 
later it precisely castrated the interests of 
Muslims to strengthen its position. 
Mohammad Roem, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 
and Mohammad Natsir were Muslim figures 
who were not allowed to contest national 
politics at the time. Therefore, Mohammad 
Natsir took the initiative to establish DDII 
(Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council) towards 
the end of the 60's.17 
The return of Muslims to take part in the 
New Order era did not seem to be welcomed, 
Soeharto not only eliminated the PKI but also 
removed the Muslims. This is based on the 
unilateral interests of the New Order in 
running the wheels of government, Soeharto's 
background which is Islamic abangan and his 
perspective on Islam influences the model of 
government that is carried out. 18  So that 
Muslims suspect that the New Order 
government has been infiltrated by certain 
parties who aim to achieve hidden interests.19 
According to Ariel Heryanto, the Soeharto 
                                                          
16 M. Imdadun Rahmat, Arus Baru Islam Radikal : 
Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke Indonesia ( 
Jakarta: Erlangga,2007),p.81-85. 
17 Robert Pringle, Understanding Islam in Indonesia: 
Politics and Diversity, ( Singapore: Didier Millet PTE 
LTD,2010), p.93- 98. 
18 Robert W.Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (ed), 
Islam in Era Of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal 
in Muslim Southeast Asia (Hawai’i:University of Hawai’i 
Press,1997),p.77-79. 
19 Ibid. 
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government was rich in sharing political 
maneuvers with a tendency to patrimonalism.20 
From the beginning, Suharto's desire to 
obstruct the various desires and aspirations of 
the Muslims was so clear.21 The perception of 
the New Order regime when the state wanted 
to be built using Islamic conceptions. The 
failure of the Masyumi leaders to rehabilitate 
his own party and various other desires such as 
the application of Islam as the basis of the 
state; the wish of Mohammad Hatta, former 
Vice President along with HMI and PII 
exponents, to establish the PDII party 
(Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party); the 
aspirations of Muhammadiyah leaders to 
reactivate the PII party (Indonesian Islamic 
Party) were strongly responded by the New 
Order regime. Even more frontal, Soeharto 
with his "iron-handed" politics suppress radical 
Islamic groups that have the potential to fight 
the government.22 
Encouragement of religious 
formalization is often launched by some who 
want strong elements of doctrine to be 
included in Shar'i values, this is an awareness of 
God's presence in the daily dimension. Middle 
Eastern cultures are tried to be institutionalized 
as characteristics that isolate interests outside 
of them. Therefore, the perspective of Islamic 
inclusiveness cannot be avoided to place 
religion as the basis of action, no longer 
ethically Islamic.23 Which does not only convey 
                                                          
20 Ariel Heryanto and Sumit K.Mandal (ed), 
Challenging Authoritarianisme in Southeast Asia Comparing 
Indonesia and Malaysia (New York:Routledge,2003),p.4-5; 
also see, Wieringa. "Islam and Popular Culture in 
Indonesia and Malaysia." Der Islam, vol. 90, no. 2, 2013, 
pp. 481-482. 
21 Kenneth M. George,  "Designs on Indonesia's 
Muslim Communities." The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 
57, no. 3, 1998, p. 693-713. 
22Andrew Weintraub. "'Dance Drills, Faith 
Spills': Islam, Body Politics, and Popular Music in Post-
Suharto Indonesia." Popular Music, vol. 27, no. 3, 2008, 
p. 367-392. 
23 Robert W. Hefner, Zachary Abuza, and Gerry 
van Klinken. "Religion and Violence in Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia." The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 67, no. 2, 
2008, p. 667. 
contradictions between right and wrong, 
between right and wrong, unclean and lawful 
so that it falls into the exclusivity of religion 
which is still prominent.24 
In the meantime, the attitudes of 
monotheistic militancy appear in the social 
structure of the Indonesian people. The 
framework of fundamentalism was born in the 
era of the 70s era, was Imaduddin Abdulrahim, 
one of the initiators of the birth of ICMI in the 
90s. He is a graduate of ITB (Bandung 
Institute of Technology) who has influence in 
the world of campus preaching. In that era, he 
was the initiator of various da'wah movements 
initiated by Salman ITB mosque. For those 
who know him, his critical attitude towards the 
New Order raises the notion that he is part of 
Islamic fundamentalists. At first, he joined the 
HMI (Islamic Student Association), then to 
channel his spirit of da'wah he often fostered 
da'wah cadres who opposed the New Order 
regime. After returning from his education in 
America, he did not dampen his enthusiasm to 
build religious awareness in his alma mater, he 
often offered ideas that tended to arouse 
youth's enthusiasm at that time to study Islam 
more deeply. In the end, he became a central 
figure in the campus da'wah movement that 
inspired similar models throughout Indonesia. 
His figure has given birth to a new model of 
non-mainstream da'wah, which can be done 
among students. Therefore, stretching da'wah 
at the university illustrates the other side of the 
attitude of fundamentalism that is built based 
on the reaction of the younger generation who 
try to find understanding of religion based on 
the construction of the logic of Islam-
scientific.25 
Furthermore, campus proselytizing 
militancy driven by students correlates with 
                                                          
24 Vali Nasr,. "The Rise Of "Muslim 
Democracy"." Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 2, 2005, 
p. 13-27. 
25Jimly Asshiddiqie ed, Bang Imad: Pemikiran dan 
Gerakan Dakwahnya ( Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002). 
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transnational movements in the 21st century 
today. Many fundamentalistic ideas were 
absorbed by them, often they studied the 
thoughts of Middle Eastern revivalism, such as: 
Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Bana, Abul A'la Al-
Maududi. Although they are not from the 
pesantren group that specifically studies 
religion, religious diversity is very pronounced, 
the process of Islamization in the academic 
world is not only through science, but also 
penetrates the non-compromise attitude which 
is their doctrinal perspective. 26  Religious 
symbols, the use of everyday language began to 
be used to reveal the element of Arabism 
within them. That there has been a shift in 
Islamic identity which is influenced by the 
actualization of the values and norms of shari'a 
non-critics.27 
 
Religious Contestation in Public Sphere 
The interpretation of religion in the 
public sphere has a tremendous impact in the 
community. At present, the meaning of 
religion becomes rather rigid which is 
connoted as a symbol of radicalism. 28  When 
radicalism is described as the ability to interpret 
religion in a public space, the consequences 
displayed have different interpretations. Based 
on the Indonesian Dictionary, 29  the term 
radicalism has at least three meanings, namely 
(1) radical understanding or flow in politics; (2) 
understanding or flow that wants social or 
political change or renewal in a violent or 
drastic manner; (3) extreme attitudes in 
political flow. Of the three terms, the second 
understanding seems more appropriate to 
explain the symptoms of religious radicalism in 
                                                          
26 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, "Political Islam in 
Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory." Asian Survey, 
vol. 44, no. 5, 2004, p. 669-690.  
27  Johan Meuleman (ed), Islam in the Era of 
Globalization : Muslim Attitudes Towards Modermity and 
Identity ( London & New York: Routledge, 2002). 
28 Andreas Ufen,  "Party Systems, Critical 
Junctures, and Cleavages in Southeast Asia."Asian 
Survey, vol. 52, no. 3, 2012, p. 441-464. 
29 http://kbbi.kemdikbud.go.id, accessed July 
2018. 
Indonesia and some other Muslim-majority 
countries. Radical Muslim groups have a strong 
tendency to make Islamic social and political 
changes in various ways, even with violence. 
The meaning of radicalism thus has a negative 
nuance. 
On the other hand, the debate over 
ethnic, religious, racial and class groups 
(SARA) in the public sphere became a study 
that attracted the attention of state loyalists and 
religious loyalists. A more specific study in the 
modern debate by raising the term 
"politicization of religion" which is widely 
discussed in the stage of national-international 
studies. All of that is a form of strengthening 
socio-religious identity.30  Strengthening socio-
religious identity has existed since humans 
began to interact with others. The framework 
of the study of the politicization of religion 
initially comes from the classical debate 
between religion (al-din) and the state (al-daulah) 
in the study of Islamic politics (al-islam al-
shiyasiy or siyasah syar'iyyah) which continues to 
develop until now.31 
Although Indonesia adheres to Pancasila 
as the basis of the state, not based on religion 
(Islam), but the state has an obligation to 
protect its adherents to religion. Although 
religion (Islam) is no longer a tool of legitimacy 
of political power, but on a social level, besides 
being a moral-ethical guide in social life, it is 
the basis for important social identity and 
political affiliation. 32  This was confirmed by 
Hefner that political organization in modern 
Indonesia was built on loyalty to existing 
religions and communities, which he knew 
with the term flow of politics.33 
                                                          
30 Carool Kersten, "Islamic Post-Traditionalism: 
Postcolonial and Postmodern Religious Discourse in 
Indonesia." Sophia, vol. 54, no. 4, 2015, p. 473-489. 
31 Youssef M. Choueiri, Islamic... 
32 Stephen A. Douglas,  "Politics in Indonesia: 
Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance." The 
Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, 1997, p. 266-267.  
33 Robert Hefner. Civil Islam : Muslims and 
Democratization in Indonesia (UK:Priceton University 
Press, 2000),p. 76-82. 
     
    ISLAM REALITAS: Journal of Islamic & Social Studies                         Vol. 4, No. 2, Juli-Desember 2018  
 
 
110 
 
This is increasingly evident during the 
transition of multicultural politics which has 
strengthened the paradigm of political 
ethnocentrism — using views and ways of life 
from its point of view as a benchmark for 
assessing other groups. The emergence of the 
ethnocentrism movement in Indonesia began 
to be seen after obtaining Indonesian 
independence from the hands of the invaders. 
This form of ethnocentrism with the 
emergence of the Islamization and 
Christianization movements.34 
By the end of the New Order 
government ahead of the reform transition, the 
Islamization movement had given rise to 
tensions between Muslim and Christian 
communities. This tension occurred because of 
the discrimination of the Soeharto government 
against Christian communities with the 
marginalization efforts of Muslim groups. This 
can be seen from the establishment of the 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals 
(ICMI), indirectly having an affiliation with the 
New Order authorities.35 
The collapse of the New Order on May 
21, 1998, provided opportunities for the 
presence of the dynamics of political culture 
which again played the role of civil society as 
the spearhead of political change in Indonesia. 
The political openness of civil society through 
the right to equality of association is a 
participatory mandate.36 However, this role is 
still interpreted as limited to building 
"strength" in politics. Therefore, it makes the 
behavior of "pulling" political interests 
between individuals and individuals, individuals 
with groups and groups with other groups, 
                                                          
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Patrice C. Brodeur,  "Civil Islam: Muslims and 
Democratization in Indonesia." The Muslim World, vol. 
92, no. 1, 2002, p. 216-222. 
using media or tools that are considered to 
have the power to occupy political power.37 
The reappearance of the Islamism 
movement in the 20th century marked the end 
of Western colonialism, in Muslim countries 
(Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Algeria), reviving 
concepts of radicalism which led to political 
conflict between Islamic loyalists (religious 
authority) with state loyalists (state authorities). 
From this, a systematic study was developed 
between the issue of religion that was brought 
to the public sphere which has always evolved 
to the present with the transformation towards 
the dynamics of contemporary issues.38 
In general, socio-religious movements 
usually take several models: 1) the 
transformative movement and the 
revolutionary movement which both aim to 
change the structure of the life of a society 
which is seen as a total crisis; 2) reformative 
movement which aims to change certain 
aspects of people's lives; 3) the redemptive 
movement that commonly occurs within the 
scope of the religious sect towards complete 
safety; and 4) an alternative movement, as 
opposed to a rescue movement that aims to 
change a small part of the individual lives of its 
members.39 
The concept of the public sphere that 
was appointed by Habermas was a space for 
critical discussion, open to everyone. In this 
public sphere, private citizens (private people) 
gather to form a public, where "public reason" 
will work as a supervisor of state power. 
Exchange of opinions and active participation 
                                                          
37  Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan : 
Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Teraju,2002), p. 45-47. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Anthony Giddens. New Rules of Sociological 
Method. (California: Stanford University Press, 1993); 
also see Sanjay G. Reddy. "The Dilemmas of 
Globalization." Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 15, no. 
1, 2001, p. 159. 
     
    ISLAM REALITAS: Journal of Islamic & Social Studies                         Vol. 4, No. 2, Juli-Desember 2018  
 
 
111 
 
in the process of public decision making is a 
new meaning of "public" in a modern sense.40 
In the Indonesian context, the 
development of the Islamic movement, in the 
last thirty years, has undergone many changes 
in the vision and socio-political orientation that 
has been championed. What is interesting is 
that the movement is more directed to the 
process of re-Islamization which is related to 
social practices and disciplinary practices to 
form active Muslim subjects in the public 
sphere. 41  However, the Islamic movement's 
project is not directed at establishing an Islamic 
state or supporting military use and violence to 
create programs to create "good Muslim" 
individuals and communities. But the project is 
directed to self-transformation through 
morality and ethics as a foundation for being 
able to appear in the public space.42 
Current discourse on radicalism as the 
main issue of religious understanding often 
leads to the struggle of an inappropriate 
understanding, that radicalism is manifested as 
an individual pattern of piety has no basis at 
all. In contrast to radicalism, piety is not 
negative even it has humanism values that can 
be used to counter radicalism.43 
According to Pipensky, piety in Islam is 
Muslim who believes and practices or runs the 
pillars of Islam, creed, performs prayers, 
performs Fasting in the month of Ramadan, 
pays Zakat, and performs Hajj to the holy land 
if he is able. Even so, the term piety is also 
equipped with sunnah worship such as reciting 
the Qur'an, giving charity, helping others and 
other good social behaviors. The definition of 
                                                          
40 Rodney Benson, "Shaping the Public Sphere: 
Habermas and Beyond." The American Sociologist, vol. 40, 
no. 3, 2009, p. 175-197. 
41 Thomas Gibson, "Islam and the Spirit Cults in 
New Order Indonesia: Global Flows Vs. Local 
Knowledge." Indonesia, no. 69, 2000, p. 41-70. 
42 Iqra Anugrah,. "Islam in Contention: Rethinking 
Islam and State in Indonesia."Indonesia, no. 95, 2013, p. 181-
183,189. 
43 Watson, "Islamic Books and their Publishers: 
Notes on the Contemporary Indonesian Scene." Journal 
of Islamic Studies, vol. 16, no. 2, 2005, p. 177.  
piety conveyed by Pipensky above, self-
recognized by him, is very relative and 
debatable. He even says that piety has four 
assumptions: (1) Piety is a property of 
individual (piety is a private matter) (2) Piety is 
unobservable (3) Piety is multifaceted (4) Piety 
is apolitical (piety is apolitics).44 
Pipensky once again holds that the 
measure of a Muslim's piety can be seen from 
the implementation of the pillars of Islam. This 
is because the pillars of Islam are compulsory 
which is not limited by the geography and 
culture in which a Muslim lives. The 
mainstream schools and schools of Islam 
recognize the pillars of Islam as an obligation 
that must be believed and implemented by a 
Muslim. 
 
Campus Islamization in Contemporary 
Indonesia 
The political and social situation that 
occurred in Indonesia during the 70s and 80s 
which resulted in the pressure of the New 
Order power was felt by Islamic activists. 
However, the situation did not diminish their 
enthusiasm in preaching non-confrontational 
Islam, so the method used was hidden. In this 
regard, there has been a depoliticization of 
Islam carried out by the New Order. The 
euphoria of Indonesian society at that time 
caused anxiety for some people who were 
worried about the degradation of ethics and 
morals, especially with the condition of their 
young generation if there were no religious 
teachings that imprinted on them, then how 
terrible result. Such a perspective inspires 
da'wah activists to transmit a hanif ideology, 
which frees society from the shackles of 
ignorance towards the ultimate source of 
truth.45 
                                                          
44 Thomas Pepinksy. Piety and Public Opinion: 
Understanding Indonesian Islam (UK: Oxford 
University Press,2002). 
45 Interview with alumni activists of the Jamaah 
Shalahuddin UGM campus, January 2018. 
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The emergence of the campus da'wah 
movement spearheaded by Salman Mosque 
ITB, then followed by various campuses 
throughout Indonesia. The next phase, DDII, 
which was founded by Mohammad Natsir, 
provided support to Islamic students to 
institutionalize campus propaganda institutions 
in each university mosque. Among other things 
spread in Bandung, Yogyakarta, Padang, 
Lampung and Ujung Pandang, the actors are 
alumni of the Salman Mosque ITB. They move 
one voice based on concern for the injustice of 
the ruler, and return to the true teachings of 
Islam. On the other hand, the threat of 
secularization cannot be avoided, according to 
them western culture that enters Indonesia 
damages the community's religious system.46 
They move one voice based on concern 
for the injustice of the ruler, and return to the 
true teachings of Islam. On the other hand, the 
threat of secularization cannot be avoided, 
according to them western culture that enters 
Indonesia damages the community's religious 
system.47 
As explained above, the propaganda 
initiated by the students was greeted with joy 
throughout Indonesia. Which then universities 
like UI, UGM, IPB, ITB became the pioneer 
of the implementation of campus preaching in 
Indonesia. These four universities are central 
to the training of activists throughout 
Indonesia, then campus preaching extends to 
religious campuses such as the IAIN (State 
Islamic Institute), and STAIN (State Islamic 
High School). There is no denying the 
presence of these activists as a religious belief 
that is used as a legitimacy of non-
confrontational resistance caused by the 
suppression of the political regime. 
Considering the opinion of Riaz Hassan, the 
                                                          
46  M.Imdadun Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS: dari 
Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen 
(Yogyakarta:LKiS,2008). 
47 Gregory Starret,” The Varieties of Secular 
Experience”, Society for the Comparative Study od Society and 
History, 3, 52, 2010, p.626-651.  
strong doctrine of teachings gave rise to an 
enlightment movement, this was like that of 
Muhammadiyah which at first was a modern 
Islamic purification movement. The idea of 
piety became the attraction they offered, 
religious beliefs became the only way to 
develop the movement.48 
 
Islam Revivalism and Fundamentalism 
Among Youths 
The youth movement is increasingly 
revealing Islamic symbols and identities in the 
public space of the 70s to 80s, in addition to 
the rampant preaching of campuses in various 
universities in Indonesia, the generation of 
Muslim women at that time began to dare to 
use a veil, then among those who were male 
men keep beards, call among themselves as 
ikhwan and akhwat. The influence of the rise 
of modern Islam emerged in this era, not only 
from the Middle East. Rather, the pan 
Islamism movement in Pakistan, Turkey, 
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, and so on 
contributed to the development of the 
movement.49 The position of Muslims who are 
always marginalized triggers a series of efforts 
to present Islamization models in various 
fields, such as the establishment of Islamic 
education institutions, Islamic banking that has 
begun to grow, social institutions established 
for the benefit of Muslims. Then, in terms of 
religious performance, there was a shift in 
religious orientation which was initially 
pragmatic to be more religious. Not only do 
rituals that are right, but patterns of 
indoctrination become daily practices. 
Actualization of Shar'i values was 
proclaimed as a solution to overcome the 
inability of the state to accommodate the 
developing situation of the 70s, the presence of 
                                                          
48 Riaz Hassan,” On Being Religious : Pattern of 
Religious Commitment in Muslim Societies”, The 
Muslim World, 3, 2007,p. 437-478. 
49 Howard M. Federspiel,  "Modernist Islam in 
Southeast Asia: A New Examination." The Muslim 
World, vol. 92, no. 3, 2002, p. 371-386. 
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campus propaganda became an alternative to 
madrasas and pesantren as government-
supported religious formal education. In fact, 
the aspirations of Muslims at the practical level 
are always not well accommodated. Western 
domination which has always been the da'wah 
rhetoric promoted by activists has become a 
manifestation of public piety driven through 
campus.50 
The usrah that have been formed are 
then directed to explore the training that has 
been previously designed, such as the Da'wah 
Mujahid Training, which is carried out in 
Islamic Mentoring and Integrated Islamic 
Studies. Such models were adopted from 
training initiated by the Ikwanul Muslimin and 
Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami which was 
represented by the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah 
Council (DDII). At the same time, the 
government was suspicious of such preaching. 
At the end of the 70s, the New Order carried 
out the Normalization of Campus Life (NKK), 
which was due to government concerns in 
dealing with the religious fundamentalism 
movement carried out by students at that 
time.51 
In the framework of the government, 
seeking a campus free from politics. According 
to Hefner, the religious fundamentalism 
movement can be seen as a modern Islamic 
narrative caused by social, economic and 
political dynamics in the structure of 
Indonesian society. The turmoil exists because 
Islam in Indonesia becomes the main vortex of 
"tension" which often has to deal with the 
interests of the state.52 
Campus Da'wah has been manifested as 
a method for finding adjustments to religious 
systems beliefs. Their militancy is formed as a 
moral force in the fight against 
                                                          
50 Thomas B.Pepinksy, Piety...p. 62-67. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Robert W.Hefner, Remaking Muslim Politics: 
Pluralism, Contestaton, Democratization (US: Princeton 
University Press,2004). 
unrighteousness, and injustice. Religion is the 
only ideology that can move quietly, without 
losing its essence. Idealism as an agent of 
change is institutionalized in a movement that 
is able to fight without having to confront 
directly. Even so, the government sees it as a 
conservative movement that can at times 
endanger the country's sovereignty.53 
Modern society cosmopolitanism 
sometimes accompanies religious interests as a 
foundation for democratization in the global 
era. At the time the West became a dialectic 
reference between compromises to create 
peace and humanitarian values.54 On the other 
hand, Western hegemony always creates 
concern in Muslim regions in various parts of 
the world. Nevertheless, the West reasoned to 
create an expansion of civilization that was 
able to bridge the interests of various groups.55 
The existence of secularization provides an 
argument for reacting reactively to situations 
that are considered to sow fear. Therefore 
fundamentalism was brought to liberate 
Western idealism from the dark side of Muslim 
society. As a result, religion has become a 
neglected value in the worldview, even 
educated groups are following this flow. 
Academic knowledge is used to see the 
possibilities of friction between religion and 
the interests of the state, the identity and 
legitimacy of power is an excuse to marginalize 
religious aspirations in the public sphere.56 
Religious doctrine is used as an excuse 
by some individuals and groups in showing 
piety in expressing the observance of shar'i 
values. Islam becomes a public symbol and 
political aspirations voiced by certain groups. 
                                                          
53 Asef Bayat (et.al), Being Young and Muslim: New 
Cultural Politics in the Global South and North ( US:Oxford 
University Press,2010),p. 28-31. 
54 Atreyee Gupta, "Cosmopolitan Modernism 
and a Politics of the Self in Muslim South Asia." Art 
Journal, vol. 71, no. 3, 2012, p. 117-119. 
55 Saul Tobias, "Pragmatic Pluralism: Arendt, 
Cosmopolitanism, and Religion." Sophia, vol. 50, no. 1, 
2011, p. 73-89. 
56 Ibid. 
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At a certain point, the voicing group consists 
of educated people, they will fight for the 
idealism that has been shackled in the 
perspective of an authoritarian regime.57 
Often power becomes a tool to achieve 
certain interests. The creation of framing in the 
community was carried out to give the 
impression that the regime was making efforts 
to refresh the instability of the situation. The 
existence of pros and cons in the community is 
utilized along with the Islamic dynamics 
trapped in the scriptural and non-scriptural 
groups. Transnationalism issues are deliberately 
led by parties who do not like developing 
domestic interests, here the role of educated 
people is that most of the students contribute 
critical ideas for the progress of the country 
according to their perspective.58 They saw that 
the occurrence of modern imperialism carried 
out by the interests of the regime, religious 
understanding across from power would be 
suppressed.59 
The process of modernization of Islam 
which has actually taken place from the 19th 
century has changed the relationship between 
Islam and the West. Moreover, Indonesia as 
the majority of Islam in the world has an 
important position in global relations, the 
anxiety of some Islamic groups that are not 
accommodated in their interests is a problem 
that often occurs. They speak of the Shari'a 
and the state must be united in the same 
portion, which is what raises Islamization in 
various fields. Western ideologies that are thick 
with capitalism and secularization are always 
used as reasons that weaken the authoritarian 
of Islam.60 
                                                          
57 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam... 
58 Inaya Rakhmani, Mainstreaming Islam in 
Indonesia : Television, Identity, and the Middle Class (US: 
Palgrave Macmillan,2016), p. 24-29. 
59 Mona Abaza, "More on the Shifting Worlds of 
Islam. the Middle East and Southeast Asia: A Troubled 
Relationship?" The Muslim World, vol. 97, no. 3, 2007, p. 
419-436. 
60 Edward Aspinall,. "The Surprising 
Democratic Behemoth: Indonesia in Comparative Asian 
Islam is expected to appear in the public 
space in a different way, he is expected to 
dynamize in various fields. So in fact, Islamism 
is an ideology that is processed to display 
Islamic revivalism in the international world 
which was initiated by classical and 
contemporary Islamic figures, such as Ibn 
Taymiyyah (1263-1228) and Muhammad Ibn 
Abdul Wahhab (1703-1787). Indeed, when 
Islam is only seen partially, it is only as a rite 
that it does not arrive at institutionalized 
teachings in daily life. So that these figures look 
to do 'restoration' of past glory. So revivalism 
and puritanism are the only way that must be 
done to rival Western modernity.61 
The issues of contemporary Islamism 
that spread to Indonesia were largely inspired 
by Egyptian reformist ideas and discourses 
such as Jamaludin Al-Afghani (1838-1897), 
Muhammad Abduh (1859-1905) and Rasid 
Ridha (1865-1935). These figures are 
influenced by the social and political 
conditions in their country, their ideas are 
endeavored to support modernity 
(modernizing Islam). On the other hand, Islam 
becomes the umbrella of modernity (Islamising 
modernity). 62  According to Rippin, that 
Islamist movements aim at a comprehensive 
reform of the political, economic and social 
world in the country. Therefore, the style of 
the Islamism movement is giving birth to belief 
in Islam as a foundation for all aspects of life 
that are private to the public sphere.63 
Another thing that deserves attention is 
the conception of Jihad. The thing that should 
                                                                                        
Perspective." The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 74, no. 4, 
2015, pp. 889-902. 
61 Mandaville. Global Political Islam 
(London:Routledge,2007) 
62 Roxanne L. Euben. "Premodern, Antimodern, 
Or Postmodern? Islamic and Western Critiques of 
Modernity." The Review of Politics, vol. 59, no. 3, 1997, p. 
429-459. 
63 Rippin. Muslim : Their Religious Beliefs and 
Practices (London:Routledge,2005); Edward Schatz. 
"Islamism and Anti-Americanism in Central 
Asia." Current History, vol. 101, no. 657, 10, 2002. 
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not be forgotten is the emergence and 
development of the conception of jihad which 
has changed meaning for years. Jihad, which 
began in earnest efforts in mobilizing energy, 
thought and wealth for "Islamic awakening" 
through da'wah, turned out to be more 
artificial and physical.64 Jihad is not understood 
to be no different from gun violence. This is a 
transformation of the meaning of jihad that is 
now often occurring among Islamic societies, 
especially Wahhabi followers or Wahhabism, 
which is identical with neo-fundamentalism or 
neo-salafi. The early Wahabis interpreted jihad 
as a struggle to uphold monotheism, but later 
jihad was an uncompromising global resistance 
movement, with anyone who was ideologically 
different. Abdul Wahab appreciated Jews and 
Christians, while Osamah bin Laden had no 
compromise, did not cooperate and did not 
dialogue. What exists is a war against Jews, 
Christians and the West globally.65 
Such a conception of jihad seems to 
continue to grow in Indonesia today, that jihad 
is synonymous with violence, such as placing 
bombs in public places, harming people of 
different faiths and ideologies and other 
terrorists. That is what Fazlur Rahman 
criticized as a narrow salafi form, not a salafi 
who took the spirit like Ibn Taymiyah or Abu 
Hamid al-Ghazali. Al-Gazali states that human 
actions are not zhahir, appearing as good 
(jihad), but there are actions that are inward. 
This is truly the most important part in faith in 
God. Therefore, our task is not only to carry 
out the fiqh, in theology (the science of kalam) 
or in rationality and inwardness alone. But 
                                                          
64 Mahmood Mamdani, "Whither Political 
Islam?; the War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the 
West." Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 1, Jan, 2005, p. 148. 
65 William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in 
Indonesia: A Political Explanation." The Journal of Asian 
Studies, vol. 55, no. 3, 1996, p. 613-634. 
everything is in Sufism. Sufism is one of the 
opening ways to truth.66 
The space for the movement of Islamic 
organizations in the New Order era was 
limited, especially with the direction of 
Suharto's depoliticization of Muslims so 
intensively. The author would like to 
emphasize the influence of transnational 
Islamic organizations such as Hizbut-Tahrir 
and the Muslim Brotherhood, which in fact the 
two mass organizations had a tremendous 
influence when the New Order came to 
power. 67  The mass organization is a new 
Islamic movement which has always been 
accused of the New Order as an 
unconstitutional movement that has become 
the enemy of the government, therefore such 
organizations must be fought because it is not 
in line with government policy.68 
Another thing that Islamic students do 
to respond to the repressive New Order policy 
is by cadre among themselves. There are those 
who call it LKD (da'wah cadre training), LMD 
(training in da'wah mujahid) and SII (intensive 
Islamic studies). This was solely carried out as 
a step to strengthen the position of the campus 
da'wah movement in negotiating with the 
political atmosphere at that time.69 
The 1980s were an important part of the 
development of Islam in Indonesia. In the 
1980s, on non-Islamic-based campuses such as 
the Institute of Technology (ITB), Bogor 
Agricultural Institute (IPB), University of 
Indonesia (UI) and Brawijaya University 
developed campus study groups, often referred 
to as the Campus Da'wah Movement , 
                                                          
66 van der Vyver. "Religious Fundamentalism 
and Human Rights." Journal of International Affairs, vol. 
50, no. 1, 1996, p. 21. 
67 Richard C. Martin,  "Civil Islam: Muslims and 
Democratization in Indonesia." The Journal of Asian 
Studies, vol. 61, no. 2, 2002, p. 774-776. 
68 Julia D.Howell, "Sufism and the Indonesian 
Islamic Revival." The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 60, no. 
3, 2001, p. 701-729. 
69 M. Imdadun Rahmat. Ideologi...,p.10-12. 
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congregation of musholla, usrah, tarbiyah and 
halaqah groups.70 
The Islamic movement groups of the 
Campus have at least characteristics, extending 
the beard (which is considered part of the 
sunnah of the Prophet), extending the veil, 
which previously used the headscarf was only 
identical to krudung (Mbak Tutut veil / Ibu 
Shinta Abdurrahman Wahid), later developed 
into the headscarf of Astri Ivo, Inneke 
KoesHerawati, Desy Ratnasari, Ratih 
Sanggarwati, even before the hijab and veil 
Krisdayanti for the female campus recitation 
group. As for the male group, in addition to 
lengthening the beard, blackening the 
forehead, and calling it “ana” and “antum”. 
These two vocabulary words are almost always 
used by campus study groups so that they 
differ from other groups of worshipers. Some 
even call it the call of the brothers and sisters, 
identification of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The emergence of the Tarbiyah 
Movement in Indonesia cannot be separated 
from the campus da'wah movement. Two 
important things that can be used as a foothold 
in identifying the birth of the campus da'wah 
movement, are First, with regard to the 
emergence of high-spirited young groups 
studying and practicing Islam in response to 
the New Order's political pressure on Muslims. 
Secondly, the existence of a relatively spacious 
public space, such as a mosque or campus 
mosque, as an ideal place for young Muslims.71 
The rise of campus preaching is caused 
by; first is an increasingly deep religious 
awareness of students; second, there was a 
kind of identity crisis among students and 
students who were to overcome the crisis, so 
                                                          
70 Edward Aspinall,. "The Irony Of 
Success." Journal of Democracy, vol. 21, no. 2, 2010, p. 20-
34.  
71 Burhanuddin Muhtadi. Dilema PKS: Suara dan 
Syariah (Jakarta:gramedia, 2012),p.204; also see Scott B. 
MacDonald, and Jonathan Lemco. "Political Islam in 
Southeast Asia."Current History, vol. 101, no. 658, 11, 
2002, p. 388-392. 
returning to Islam was the solution, and; third, 
the da'wah activists are convinced that in order 
to deal with problems in the future, it is Islam 
that can answer them.72 
The phenomenon of campus 
proselytizing is a piety representation in public 
spere, this is interpreted as a commitment to 
carry out all religious recommendations such as 
five daily prayers, deepening the science of 
religion, behaving Islamically. 73  This process 
requires interiorization that focuses on self-
discipline, which according to their assumption 
campus propaganda can protect from the 
influence of western modernity.74 
In addition, the practices of campus 
proselytizing as stated by Benjamin F. Soares 
(2004) relate to public piety who seek to 
negotiate with state policies that are not in line 
with the idealism of the activists. Because 
campus da'wah activities try to make their own 
regulations which have an impact on the social 
and political structures that make the 
government's suspicion even higher. The 
activists want the enactment of 'piety' or 
'Islamic' values in the community and even 
want to control and discipline the community 
regarding the regime's attitudes and behavior. 
Islam has been used as ideological tools to 
fight colonialism and strengthen the 'religious' 
character of the state.75 
So this is the background of the 
emergence of various campus da'wah in 
Indonesia. Each of them has a religious 
experience that is different from one another, 
according to Baran (2014) that as lived-religion 
is the actual experience of an institutionalized 
                                                          
72 Kikue Hamayotsu. "The Political Rise of the 
Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian 
Indonesia." Asian Survey, vol. 51, no. 5, 2011, p. 971-
992. 
73 Saiful Mujani, and William Liddle. "Muslim 
Indonesia's Secular Democracy." Asian Survey, vol. 49, 
no. 4, 2009, p. 575-590.  
74 Ibid. 
75 Elizabeth Fuller, "Islam and the Habits of 
Democracy:Islamic Organizations In Post-New 
Order." Indonesia, no. 78, 2004, p. 93-120. 
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religious person. Everyone has their own 
religious practices according to their social and 
political conditions. So that with a different 
experience will transform the identity of 
spirituality through the realization of piety and 
religious discipline in daily life.76 
   
 
 
Conclusion 
The emergence of the campus da'wah 
movement is a means of non-confrontational 
actualization to foster more intense religious 
awareness on campus or university. On the 
other hand, this reflects the "resistance" of 
young people to authoritarianism towards the 
freedom to practice diversity on campus. In 
various campuses, this missionary movement 
spread, with limited recitation models which 
were only attended by students who wanted to 
increase their knowledge of Islam.  
A new model of the movement which 
turned out to have received a great response 
especially among students. This approach then 
also attracts many parties in channeling 
disillusionment with the government more 
constructively. Logically, the government 
cannot be resisted by violence but must be 
influenced through gradual propagation. This 
is where the Tarbiyah Movement model 
emerged which became one of the new 
alternatives between the freezing facilities and 
activities of various Islamic movements and 
organizations that existed at that time. 
Intellectuality and idealism are the main 
strengths of movements that arise on campus. 
Islamic movements that appear on campus, are 
generally represented through Islamic religious 
institutions engaged in da'wah. This institution 
is often referred to as campus propaganda 
institutions. Campus da'wah institutions try to 
create a self-coaching that harmonizes Islamic 
intellectuality and idealism. In general, it can be 
                                                          
76 Zeyno Baran . Hizbut Tahrir:Islam’s Political 
Insurgency (Washington: The Nixon Center, 2004) ; Also, 
Dyna Rochmyaningsih, "Focus on Political Islamic 
Groups to Boost Science." Nature, vol. 518, no. 7540, 
2015, p. 457. 
said that the purpose of the establishment of a 
da'wah institution on campus is as a place of 
coaching for students, so that in addition to 
being mature in terms of intellectuality, it is 
also solid in terms of faith and devotion to 
Allah SWT. 
Observing the failure to build a religious 
situation recognized by the government, a 
group of people gave birth to a new model as 
an effort to solve the problems of Muslims 
with a more structured pattern. A group of 
people are mostly alumni of several Islamic 
Higher Education Institutions in the Middle 
East. They founded the Tarbiyah movement 
which was inspired by the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement in Egypt which also 
spread to the Arabian peninsula. 
The persistence of the Tarbiyah Movement 
between the crush and political pressure that 
was so strong in the long period made some 
people suspect the movement's relationship 
with the ruling regime (including intelligence). 
This is possible, but in fact the concept of the 
Tarbiyah model of da'wah that is non-
confrontational and far from these political 
issues is more protecting and distancing them 
from the oppressive hands of the government. 
The Tarbiyah movement undertook a 
strategy of withdrawing from the political 
frenzy and replacing it with Islamic studies that 
focused on deepening the practical teachings 
of Islam which were becoming increasingly 
popular among students on campuses. The 
energy that was once spent fighting and 
blaspheming the government began to be 
directed to explore Islam. Such conditions 
occur almost evenly in various state campuses 
in Indonesia. 
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